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 Evidence on the "Tax Effects" of
 Inflation under Historical Cost
 Accounting Methods*
 I. Introduction
 The potential effects of contemporary tax ac-
 counting methods under conditions of inflation
 have attracted substantial attention (see, e.g.,
 Shoven and Bulow 1975, 1976; Davidson and
 Weil 1976; Nelson 1976; Hong 1977; and Kim
 1979). In particular, there has been substantial
 interest in the potential joint effects of price-level
 changes and historical cost accounting methods
 on real tax burdens. It is usually argued that the
 failure to use indexation (i.e., the continued use
 of historical cost methods) necessarily implies
 that real rates of income tax will vary directly
 with the rate of inflation. And this substantive
 effect of mere bookkeeping methods is often pre-
 dicted even though the predicted effect is recog-
 nized to have adverse implications-such as
 It is often argued that
 the failure to use in-
 dexation (i.e., the use of
 historical cost account-
 ing methods) implies
 that real income tax
 rates will vary directly
 with rates of inflation.
 This substantive effect
 of mere bookkeeping
 methods is often pre-
 dicted even though it is
 recognized to have
 some adverse implica-
 tions. This is the "tax
 effects of inflation"
 hypothesis. The major
 objective of this paper
 is to examine the de-
 scriptive adequacy of
 this hypothesis using
 a variety of macro-
 economic data for the
 years 1929-74. My em-
 pirical results appear to
 be substantially incon-
 sistent with the tax-
 effects hypothesis.
 (Journal of Business, 1981, vol. 54. no. 2)
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 * Earlier versions of this paper were presented at work-
 shops sponsored by Stanford University and the University
 of Pennsylvania. I am indebted to the participants in these
 workshops for helpful comments and for motivating me to
 rethink many points. I benefited from numerous discussions
 with Gene Fama on this topic. The crux of my results and
 arguments are basically consistent with those given in Fama's
 recent report on this topic (see Fama March 1979). Additional
 special thanks are due to Mark Wolfson, Shyam Sunder,
 George Foster, Meir Schneller, Katherine Schipper, and Tom
 Stober. Partial financial support from the National Science
 Foundation and the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. Foun-
 dation is gratefully acknowledged, as is the incredible re-
 search assistance provided by Bruce Lederman and Mike
 Axelrod.
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 those predicted for investment incentives and productivity. This ap-
 pears to be the essence of the "tax effects of inflation" hypothesis. A
 terse but representative statement of its implications for fixed capital
 was recently provided by Meadows (1979, pp. 38-39) in an article on
 taxation and incentives: "As prices rise, the real value of depreciation
 based on historic costs dwindles and a company's taxable income goes
 up faster than it would if depreciation reflected actual replacement
 costs. The resulting erosion of corporate income lowers return on
 investment and discourages businessmen from putting money into
 capital-intensive technologies, long-lived assets, and new, more effi-
 cient replacement equipment."
 The major objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on
 some testable implications of this hypothesis. I shall argue that this
 evidence is, on balance, inconsistent with the tax-effects hypoth-
 esis-at least for the post-World War II period. This evidence is
 consistent with the hypothesis that the ultimate effects of indexing
 the tax system have been attained via devices other than formal in-
 dexation.
 This evidence does not, of course, imply that the tax-effects hypoth-
 esis does not describe what might have happened if " all other
 things" -including the rules of income taxation-were held constant.
 The apparent descriptive inadequacies of this hypothesis may simply
 be due to important changes in these "other things"-changes which
 are ignored by the partial equilibrium framework underlying the tax-
 effects hypothesis.
 The organization of this paper is as follows: Section II provides a
 review of the tax-effects hypothesis and some of its implications. The
 data and models underlying our empirical results are considered in
 Section III, and the results themselves are presented and discussed in
 Section IV. Remarks on potential reasons for the descriptive inade-
 quacy of the tax-effects hypothesis are provided in Section V. A
 summary and discussion of basic implications are provided in Section
 VI. Most arguments in all sections are expressed in terms of positive
 inflation rates. Obvious analogous arguments apply to negative rates.
 The discussion of data given in Section IV is somewhat brief. An
 extended discussion with more detailed references is given in the
 Appendix to this paper.
 II. The Tax Effects of Inflation Hypothesis
 The Basic Argument
 The tax-effects hypothesis can be decomposed into a hypothesis deal-
 ing with the expected rate of inflation and one dealing with the unex-
 pected rate of inflation. Of course, the crux of both hypotheses turns
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 on the use of "historical cost" accounting methods to compute taxable
 profits. But the joint effects of these methods and the expected rate
 of inflation on "real" economic profits and incentives may differ from
 the joint effects of these methods and the unexpected component of
 inflation.
 The accounting methods that seem to attract most attention in
 statements of the tax-effects hypothesis are depreciation methods and
 inventory accounting methods. We shall confine our attention to these
 methods.
 Given the relative prices of all final outputs and factors of produc-
 tion, both nominal (i.e., "current-dollar") sales and nominal costs will,
 for a given quantity of output, increase at a rate equal to the rate of
 inflation. Thus, nominal pretax "economic" profits will increase at this
 rate and real economic profits will remain constant.1 Given a propor-
 tional tax system based on nominal economic profits, nominal income
 taxes and nominal after-tax profits will also increase at the same rate.
 Thus, the real rate of taxation will, in this scenario, be unaffected by
 nonzero rates of actual inflation. Nor will the expected real rate of
 taxation be affected by the expected rate of inflation. In this setting of
 ''pure inflation" (i.e., fixed relative prices) and income taxes based on
 nominal economic profits, neither the expected nor the unexpected
 component of inflation will, by itself, have any substantive economic
 effect-on, for example, incentives to invest in units of capital stock.
 In a partial equilibrium analysis, the picture is entirely different when
 the computation of taxes is based on historical cost accounting
 methods for, say, depreciable assets and costs of goods sold. Nominal
 sales, for a given quantity of output, will increase at a rate equal to the
 rate of inflation. And expected nominal sales will increase at the ex-
 pected rate of inflation. But actual (expected) taxable profits and
 after-tax accounting profits will increase at a rate exceeding the actual
 (expected) rate of inflation. Thus, for a given quantity of output, the
 actual (expected) real rate of taxation will vary directly with the actual
 (expected) rate of inflation.
 The same tax effect of a once-over unexpected rate of inflation could
 be attained in a zero-inflation world, for the same level of output, by
 unexpectedly increasing the tax rate applied to periodic profits over the
 remaining lives of depreciable assets currently on hand and over the
 additional periods needed to substitute current costs for the historical
 costs of units currently in inventory. A similar equivalence exists
 1. By nominal "economic" profits, I mean profits computed in terms of the currently
 prevailing prices of outputs and of the services provided by factors of production. Real
 economic profits equals nominal profits after abstracting from general price level
 changes. Going from nominal to real profits involves, at an operational level, some heady
 issues of price-index construction which we bypass here (for extensive discussions of
 this topic, see Griliches [1971]).
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 betweeen a nonzero expected rate of inflation and an increasing ex-
 pected tax rate in a world of no inflation, since the rate of change in the
 real tax rate varies directly with the rate of inflation, conditional on the
 pattern of output and investment outlays and the use of historical cost
 accounting methods for computing taxable profits.
 These relationships between the real rate of taxation and the rate of
 inflation provide the basic underpinnings of the tax-effects hypothesis.
 Conditional on these relationships, it predicts that the strength of
 incentives to invest in long-lived assets will vary inversely with the
 expected rate of inflation. It predicts an inverse relationship between
 actual (expected) real after-tax profits and unanticipated (expected)
 rates of inflation. It predicts windfall losses on existing units of capital
 when there is unexpected inflation or an unexpected change in ex-
 pected inflation. It predicts that real aggregate taxes will increase faster
 than the two components of the inflation rate. It implies that the effects
 of both expected and unexpected inflation will be greater for more
 capital intensive firms. Moreover, the tax-effects hypothesis implies
 that these effects of expected and unexpected rates of inflation will be
 stronger (or at least different) in high relative to low nominal tax rate
 periods.
 Remarks on the Descriptive Adequacy of the Tax-Effects Hypothesis
 The tax-effects argument-with respect to both expected and unex-
 pected rates of inflation-seems to have attracted a substantial fol-
 lowing, for both theoretical and empirical reasons.2 But there are
 strong grounds for suspecting that it does not identify dominant
 influences on investment incentives or real economic profits.
 One essential aspect of using historical cost accounting methods
 under conditions of nonzero rates of inflation is that tax deductible
 costs differ from the current costs of factors of production. Indexation
 is one of the recommended remedies for this. And the fact that our tax
 system is not a fully indexed one is a major underpinning of the
 tax-effects hypothesis.
 But there are alternative ways of attaining the effects of indexation.
 The tax code may permit the use of service lives for depreciable assets
 that differ substantially from economic service lives.3 Also, it may
 permit the use of depreciation methods resulting in depreciation
 2. Useful summaries of major positions are provided in Shoven and Bulow (1975,
 1976), Aaron (1976), Cagan and Lipsey (1978), and Feldstein (1979b). The paper by
 Tideman and Tucker (1976) in the Aaron (1976, pp. 33-74) compilation is particularly
 useful.
 3. The evidence presented by Cohen (1975) is consistent with tax service lives for
 equipment that are substantially different from those revealed by actual investment
 behavior, conditional on the IRS's Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) System. The differ-
 ences seem to be larger for structures, conditional on a tax service-life equal to 23 years
 for structures.
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 charges that differ substantially from the current costs of the services
 of capital, particularly in the early years of an asset's life (via "ac-
 celerated" depreciation methods). Moreover, various "subsidy"
 schemes-such as investment tax credits-may be established.
 Given the nature of the legislative process leading to these pos-
 sibilities-in particular, the sort of "horse trading" that seems to take
 place-it is certainly not obvious that their availability is independent
 of formal indexation's availability. In other words, if the tax system
 were indexed, existing subsidy programs and existing rules regarding
 service lives and depreciation methods might be very different. These
 programs and rules may have been introduced in lieu of indexation.4
 Why one form of indexation rather than another is ultimately chosen
 is not explained here. This issue may turn on administrative efficien-
 cies, wealth redistribution objectives, "political realities," and so
 forth. The major object of analysis here is whether the end results of
 indexation were attained-and thus whether the tax-effects hypoth-
 esis is, by itself, descriptively adequate.
 The descriptive adequcy of the tax-effects argument may be ad-
 versely affected by simultaneity problems, too. Specifically, expected
 and unexpected rates of inflation may summarize (i.e., be a proxy for)
 governmental responses to observed after-tax real economic profits
 and observed rates of increase in the capital stock. It is not clear that
 these components of inflation rates are really exogenous variables.
 Suppose, for example, that after-tax real profits are deemed to be
 "too low." This may motivate the government to initiate stimulative
 policies that induce positive unexpected rates of inflation. Estimated
 correlation coefficients for unexpected rates of inflation and after-tax
 4. Indeed, they may even go beyond indexation, as measured by the difference be-
 tween, say, historical cost capital comsumption allowances and current value capital
 consumption allowances. Note, e.g., that for each of the years 1962-73, the NIPA
 (National Income and Products Accounts) Capital Consumption Adjustment for All
 Corporations was positive. This indicates that historical cost depreciation (per tax
 reports) exceeded the NIPA estimate of current value depreciation in each of those
 years. (The NIPA estimate is based on .85F service lives and straight-line depreciation.)
 (See The National Inicome and Prodluct Accolunts of the United States, 1929-1974:
 Statistical Tables [U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1977],
 pp. 46-47, table 1.15, line 6.) The total NIPA adjustment can be decomposed into an
 adjustment for depreciation methods, but still using historical cost, and an adjustment for
 the difference between historical and current costs. In table 8.7 of the NIPA accounts,
 these two adjustments are given by, respectively, "adjustment of capital consumption
 allowances to consistent accounting at historical cost" and 'adjustment of consistent
 accounting at historical cost to current replacement cost." The first adjustment is
 supposed to make the data for all firms conditional on SL depreciation and .85F service
 lives. It is, therefore, intended to abstract from "liberalized" provisions pertaining to
 depreciation methods and service lives. Over the 1962-73 period, this first adjustment
 exceeds the second adjustment, which is supposed to deal only with the difference
 between current and historical costs. A recent analysis of the potentially similar effects
 of formal indexation and accelerated depreciation methods is provided by Feldstein
 (1979a).
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 real profits (as measured in, e.g., the National Income and Product
 Accounts [NIPA]) will be negative, as predicted by the tax-effects
 hypothesis. But this empirical result is not due to the unexpected rate
 of inflation's affect on real after-tax profits. This type of negative
 association is implied by Kurz's (1979) proposed theory of inflation,
 which assumes that firms follow "correlated" pricing strategies.
 Inverse variation between the expected rate of inflation and capital
 stock growth may turn on similar forces. The government may initiate
 stimulative policies because the productivity of capital and (as a result)
 employment are "too low." These policies may induce higher ex-
 pected rates of inflation. In the end, one may observe negative covari-
 ation of the expected rate of inflation and the growth of capital.
 Alternative explanations of what is predicted by the tax-effects
 hypothesis should not be surprising. After all, empirical evidence con-
 sistent with one hypothesis may also be consistent with another, even
 conflicting, hypothesis. And the tax-effects hypothesis represents just
 one of several perspectives on the connection between inflation and
 profitability, investment incentives, and so forth. It appears, however,
 that our evidence is, on balance, not even consistent with the tax-
 effects hypothesis. As far as tax issues are concerned, this evidence is,
 therefore, apparently inconsistent with the view that accounting
 methods are permitted to have unintended substantive effects.
 III. Data and Models
 Variables Modeled and Sources of Data
 The evidence presented here deals primarily with investment incen-
 tives (to the extent reflected in rates of investment in fixed capital), real
 profits, effective real tax rates, and the tax shield provided by interest
 deductions. In each case the variable of interest is used as the depen-
 dent variable in a regression model which uses the contemporaneous
 expected and unexpected rates of inflation and the contemporaneous
 rate of change in industrial production as independent variables. The
 latter rate of change is included in order to account for the effects of
 contemporaneous "business activity" on each dependent variable of
 interest.5 Accounting for these effects is motivated by the fact that
 many predictions of the tax-effects hypothesis are conditional on
 changes in business output or "business activity." The estimation
 results pertain to the resulting estimated regression functions, and our
 interpretations invoke the regression function perspective, as devel-
 5. All regression model results discussed below were also obtained for models that did
 not include, as an independent variable, the contemporaneous rate of change in industrial
 production. Noteworthy differences between these unreported results and those pre-
 sented here are discussed at appropriate points in the text.
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 oped in, for example, Cramer (1946). For each variable of interest, we
 shall be interested in the expected value of that variable taken condi-
 tionally on the contemporaneous values of the expected and unex-
 pected rates of inflation and assuming linear regression functions.
 The major sources of the annual data used to compute the values of
 our dependent variables are: (1) The National Income and Product
 Accounts of the United States, 1929-1974: Statistical Tables (U.S.
 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1977),
 referred to as NIPA data; and (2) Fixed Nonresidential Business and
 Residential Capital in the United States, 1925-1975 (U.S. Department
 of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1976), referred to as BEA
 data.
 The data obtained from source 2 were revised in accordance with
 data supplied by John A. Gorman and John C. Musgrave of the Bureau
 of Economic Analysis; they also supplied data on inventory stocks. We
 refer to the latter as BEA data also.
 Some of the NIPA data used here are the revised values provided in
 the July 1977 and July 1978 issues of the monthly Survey of Current
 Business (U.S. Department of Commerce 1977-78).
 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used to measure the rate of
 inflation. Our data on actual and expected rates of inflation were kindly
 supplied by G. William Schwert of the University of Rochester.
 The Federal Reserve Board's Index of Industrial Production (Total)
 for the year t - 1 to t is used to measure the level of output for year t.
 Annual values of this index, from the year 1919, were taken from table
 A-5 of Industrial Production: 1976 Edition (Federal Reserve System,
 Board of Governors 1977).
 A variety of unreported results were obtained by using data from the
 U.S. Internal Revenue Service. These results are described in the
 January 1980 version of this report (Gonedes 1980). They did not lead
 to inferences substantially different from those described below.
 Additional remarks on the data used here as well as our estimates of
 the expected annual rate of inflation are provided in the Appendix to
 this paper. An overview of the variables used to define the dependent
 variables for our estimated regression models and the sources used to
 get observations on these variables is provided in the unnumbered
 table below.
 Models
 Estimation results are presented for the entire period 1929-74 and for
 various subperiods for the following regression model:
 Yt = f0 + f1E(~t) + f2[1't - E(ii-t)] + 33Yt-1 + f4qt + (t,
 where Vt denotes the dependent variable of interest; qt denotes the rate
 of change in industrial production from time t - 1 to time t; E(#rt)
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 Summary of Variables Used (Directly or to Derive Another Variable) and Sources of Data
 Data
 Variable Used Tables Source
 1. Capital expenditures in current dollars 4 BEA
 2. Net fixed capital stock in current dollars assuming
 SL depreciation and .85F service lives 4, 2, 10, 12 BEA
 3. Profits tax liability in current dollars 1, 2, 9, 3, 12 NIPA
 4. Profits before taxes in current dollars 1, 9, 12 NIPA
 5. Capital consumption allowances in current dollars
 per national income accounts 1, 9, 12 NIPA
 6. New monetary interest in current dollars 1, 9, 12 NIPA
 7. Gross domestic product in current dollars 3 NIPA
 8. Depreciation in constant dollars for BEA capital
 stock conditional on SL depreciation 10 BEA
 9. Net fixed capital stock in constant dollars condi-
 tional on SL depreciation 10, 5, 6 BEA
 10. Net fixed residential capital in current dollars and
 (where indicated) in constant dollars assuming
 SL depreciation and .85F service lives 11, 6 BEA
 11. Inventory stocks in current dollars and constant
 dollars 11, 3, 8, 12 BEA
 12. Net interest in current dollars, after adjustments
 for imputations 9 NIPA
 13. Depreciation in constant dollars for BEA residen-
 tial capital stock, conditional on SL deprecia-
 tion and .85F service lives 11 BEA
 NOTE.-All data are for "all corporations" and, except for gross domestic product, in millions of
 dollars; gross domestic product (variable 7) is in billions of dollars. Data are annual data for calendar
 years 1929-74. BEA = Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA = National Income Products Accounts.
 denotes the expected annual rate of inflation for the period from t - 1
 to t, conditional on information available before the end of period t; and
 ijTt denotes the rate of inflation from period t - 1 to t. The variable [iTt -
 E(Frt)] is, therefore, the unexpected rate of inflation with respect to the
 period ending at time t. Estimation results are also provided for this
 model with the constraint, /83 0.0. Tilde (-) denotes a random
 variable.
 The lagged variable Yt-l was used in order to attack serial correlation
 problems that will be obvious from the estimation results presented
 below. Its introduction was not motivated by economic theory.
 One of the subperiods considered here is 1929-46. In some cases,
 use of data for 1 year, 1946, seemed to dramatically affect the estima-
 tion results, at least relative to what was expected. Thus, estimation
 results were always obtained for the period 1929-45 and for the period
 1929-46. I still do not know why 1946 occasionally had a seemingly
 important effect. The reason may turn on some quirk of the data-
 construction methods used by our sources of data. Or it may turn on
 interesting substantive issues, such as,the September 1945 termination
 of the special war-time "emergency facilities" amortization program or
 the 1946 conversions of some fixed assets from so-called Government
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 Owned but Privately Operated (GOPO) facilities to privately owned
 and privately operated facilities. (Pertinent remarks on the latter issue
 are provided by Gordon [1969]).
 The following types of estimation results are given in each table: (1)
 the estimated value of 3,i and the corresponding t-statistic, for each i;
 (2) the estimated standard deviation, o--, of the disturbance, (t; (3) the
 sample value of the adjusted coefficient of multiple determination, R2;
 (4) the standardized runs statistic, z, for the disturbance, (t; and (5) the
 estimated value of the lag-i serial correlation coefficient, pi, of the
 disturbance, (t for lags 1-5.
 IV. Estimation Results
 Effective Tax Rates
 A seemingly direct way of testing the tax-effects hypothesis is to assess
 the influence of inflation on various measures of real tax burdens.
 Conditional on a proportional income tax system, the tax-effects
 hypothesis predicts that aggregate tax liabilities will increase faster
 than the actual rate of inflation because taxable income is predicted to
 increase faster than this rate. This implies, in turn, that aggregate taxes
 will, for a given real output level, increase faster than before-tax net
 operating cash flows. Equivalently, the real rate at which these cash
 flows are taxed should be an increasing function of both the expected
 and the unexpected components of inflation. And the effect of each
 component should vary directly with the nominal tax rate as well as,
 for example, the capital intensity and "inventory intensity" of produc-
 tion.
 Estimation results dealing with this issue are presented in table 1.
 Both the numerators and denominators used for the tax rates underly-
 ing this table are in current dollars. Thus, the tax rates are in real terms.
 The denominators are intended to be proxies for the before-tax cash
 payoff to capital, which is the pretax cash flow variable relevant to
 capital budgeting issues. Results are presented for total profits taxes,
 that is, federal, state, and local profits taxes.
 For the overall period 1929-74, when Yt-1 is excluded from the
 model, the estimation results seem consistent with the tax-effects
 hypothesis as far as the expected rate of inflation is concerned. As can
 be seen, this appears to be primarily attributable to the prewar period.
 Moreover, when Yt-1 is included in the model, the results are consis-
 tent with,f3 = 0.0. In addition, contrary to the tax-effects hypothesis,
 the overall and prewar results appear inconsistent with a positive effect
 of the unexpected rate of inflation.
 Also contrary to the tax-effects hypothesis is the apparent inconsis-
 tency between the estimation results and a positive effect of the ex-
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 pected rate of inflation for the postwar period, 1947-74. For this period,
 nominal corporate income tax rates were, on average, above those
 prevailing over the 1929-46 period.
 For the postwar period, the importance of the unexpected rate of
 inflation seems to be critically dependent on whether Yt-1 is included in
 our regression model. But even when Yt-1 is included, the significance
 of the unexpected rate's influence does not seem to be overwhelming.
 Another measure of the real tax burden is considered in table 2. This
 table deals with the tax component of the rental rate per unit of
 capital-in real terms.6 The tax-effects hypothesis predicts that this
 component's importance is an increasing function of each component of
 inflation, because aggregate nominal taxes should increase faster than
 the actual rate of inflation.
 The estimation results presented in table 2 seem to tell the same
 basic story as that told by the results in table 1. As far as the expected
 rate of inflation is concerned, the results for 1929-74 seem consistent
 with the tax-effects hypothesis-when the constraint /33 = 0.0 iS im-
 posed. But this consistency appears to turn on the prewar data rather
 than the data for the higher nominal tax rate period 1947-74.
 For the prewar period, the estimated value of /2 has a sign inconsis-
 tent with the tax-effects hypothesis. In any event, the estimation re-
 sults for 2 seem inconsistent with statistical significance for this period
 as well as for the postwar period.
 The estimation results for both ,8/ and /34 are clearly dependent on
 whether Yt-1 is included in the model, at least for the prewar and
 overall periods. The point estimate and statistical significance of /,1 (,4)
 decrease (increase) when Yt-1 is included. But over the postwar period,
 the results for ,/3 (/34) are always consistent with /1 = 0 (4 :4 0). Such
 differences between prewar and postwar results-which may be due to
 structural shifts-will also appear in results described later.
 Results for a third measure of the real tax burden are presented in
 table 3. This measure pertains to total profits taxes per unit of aggregate
 domestic output (for all corporations), which is a proxy for total sales
 of current output. This measure is also in real terms. For a given level
 of output, the tax-effects hypothesis predicts that aggregate taxes
 should increase faster than the rate of inflation and that the rate of
 increase in total sales should be equal to the rate of inflation. Thus, the
 "tax-bite" per dollar of sales should be an increasing function of each
 component of the actual inflation rate. On balance, the results pre-
 sented in table 3 are consistent with those described above.
 Since the tax-effects hypothesis does not seem to identify dominant
 forces pertaining to profitability, one expects that it will not identify
 6. Pertinent expressions for this rental rate are given in, e.g., Hall and Jorgenson
 (1967, 1971).
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 dominant forces pertaining to investment incentives. Results on the
 latter are presented in the next section.
 Rates of In vestment
 There are, of course, various ways of measuring rates of investment in
 fixed capital. The results presented in tables 4-8 are based on several
 different approaches. Each one deals with a different aspect of invest-
 ment behavior, but they all seem to "tell the same story."
 The results presented in table 4 pertain to the rates of growth in fixed
 capital implied by capital expenditures, for net fixed capital conditional
 on straight-line (SL) depreciation and service lives equal to 85 percent of
 those specified in the 1942 edition of the IRS's Biulletin F, henceforth
 referred to as .85F service lives (U.S. Department of the Treasury,
 Internal Revenue Service 1942). Data for gross capital and for different
 service-life assumptions led to essentially the same results, as did data
 based on double-declining balance (DDB) depreciation; SL and DDB
 are the two methods for which BEA data are available.
 Both the numerators and denominators used for the investment rates
 for period t are in terms of the period t price level. Thus, the rates are in
 real terms. There is, of course, some measurement error here and for
 other variables based on the same denominators. Some sort of average
 of beginning of period and end of period capital stock data might be
 more appropriate. But experimentation along these lines seemed to
 lead nowhere.7
 The tax-effects hypothesis implies that the expected value of the rate
 of capital expenditure conditional on the expected rate of inflation is
 decreasing in the latter expected rate. The estimation results condi-
 tional on the constraint /3; = 0.0 are inconsistent with this for the
 overall period, 1929--74, and for both the prewar and postwar period
 and for investment rates based on both gross fixed capital and net fixed
 capital. When Yt- is allowed to enter with a nonzero coefficient, the
 results are still inconsistent with the tax-effects hypothesis.
 Note that the value of Rht is not the value of the total return per unit
 negative effect of E(iT). They are, at least for the 1929-74 and 1929-46
 periods, consistent with a positive effect. The lower nominal tax rate
 and the lower expected rates of inflation that prevailed during the
 prewar period-relative to 1947-74-may be important reasons for
 this.
 On balance, the unexpected component of the inflation rate seems to
 have no important effect on the expected rate of investment. This
 7. "Constant-dollar" data could also be used to define real rates, but such data were
 not available for all the series and years of interest here (e.g., constant-dollar Gross
 Domestic Product for all pre-1947 years). So long as our exploratory analyses did not
 imply that the choice of data type made an essential difference, we chose to use
 current-dollar data when available.
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 seems plausible. Unanticipated events of period t should have no
 systematic effect on investment rates chosen during period t.
 Of course, capital expenditure rates pertain to gross investment
 expenditures. These rates are not, therefore, adjusted for "outflows"
 of units of capital due to depreciation or sales. The capital expenditure
 rates for period t are valuable sources of information because they
 pertain to commitments made during the current period. But one can
 argue that these rates are chosen to attain desired net investment rates.
 To get some insights on net investment, one can look at results based
 on the rates of growth implied by successive values of capital stock.
 Such results are presented in tables 5-7. The data used for these tables
 are constant-dollar data. Hence, the growth rates underlying these
 tables are in real terms.
 Table 5 provides results on total capital stock, which equals residen-
 tial plus nonresidential fixed capital. The residential component is
 based on SL depreciation and the .85F service-life assumption. (For
 residential capital, data based on different depreciation methods and
 service lives are not available from the BEA data file.) If the implica-
 tions of the tax-effects hypothesis are descriptively adequate, the real
 rates of growth in total fixed capital should vary inversely with E(irit).
 As can be seen from table 5, the behavior of total fixed capital is
 inconsistent with the tax-effects hypothesis. Indeed, for the overall
 period, 1929-74, and for some of the subperiods, the estimation results
 for /38 are consistent with a significantly positive value.
 Tables 6 and 7 provide results for nonresidential and residential
 capital, respectively. The results for nonresidential fixed capital are
 substantially consistent with those for total fixed capital, probably
 because nonresidential fixed capital is the dominant component of the
 total. For the most part, the results for residential fixed capital are
 consistent with a value of /38 that is insignificantly different from zero.
 Thus, these results are also inconsistent with the tax-effects hypothe-
 sis, which implies /,3 < 0.0.
 As can be seen from the postwar results with 33 not constrained to
 equal zero, the results for residential capital are not completely incon-
 sistent with the tax-effects hypothesis. For this subperiod, the results
 for /38 are consistent with /38 < 0.0. The difference between these
 results and those for nonresidential capital may be due to the alleged
 differential effects of macroeconomic stabilization policies on con-
 struction activities. In any event, the fact the ,3 < 0.0 is not inferred for
 nonresidential capital too implies that the tax-effects hypothesis, by
 itself, is not descriptively adequate.
 Table 8 provides results on another aspect of investment incentives,
 namely, the real rate of growth in inventory. When expected rates of
 inflation are positive, the tax-effects hypothesis implies that incentives
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 to invest in inventory will be adversely affected, too, because of the
 joint effects of historical cost accounting methods and positive ex-
 pected rates of inflation. As can be seen from table 8, the estimation
 results for ,8/ appear inconsistent with ,8 < 0.0 and, thus, inconsistent
 with the tax-effects hypothesis.
 On balance, the results in tables 5-8 pertaining to /2 do not suggest
 that the unexpected component of inflation has a systematic important
 influence on rates of growth in fixed capital or inventory. This seems
 plausible. One should not expect investment decisions to be affected
 by unanticipated events.
 Nor should one overlook the limitations of our results. The influence
 of 1 year's data, namely, those for 1946, is quite puzzling. So is the
 seemingly erratic influence of the rate of change in industrial produc-
 tion. Whether these mysteries are induced by inadequacies in our data
 or in our models is still not clear on the basis of the results presented
 here or unreported results. Nevertheless, the inconsistencies between
 all of the results presented thus far and the tax-effects hypothesis seem
 too consistent to be attributable to these puzzles. The results presented
 below provide additional support-albeit indirect-for the crux of our
 inferences, and they point to some possible reasons for the inadequacy
 of the tax-effects hypothesis.
 Tax Shield Provided by Interest Deductions
 The major predictions of the tax-effects hypothesis turn on firms' not
 being permitted to deduct, for tax purposes, the current values of the
 services of factors of production used during a given period. The
 services provided by units of depreciable capital and units of inventory
 are of particular interest here. This predicament is, of course, a major
 feature of a tax system based on historical cost accounting methods,
 and it is the feature that indexation is supposed to eliminate.
 But explicit indexation may not be necessary to achieve all the
 effects of indexation. The same effects can be attained, at least with
 respect to expected rates of inflation, if nominal interest rates incorpo-
 rate unbiased forecasts of rates of inflation. (Nominal interest rates
 set when debt is issued cannot, by themselves, take unexpected rates
 of inflation into account.) If they do, then financing acquisitions of
 factors' services with debt-on which interest expense is tax de-
 ductible-provides a means of getting a tax deduction for the ex-
 pected value of the difference between historical costs and current
 costs per dollar of debt-financed outlay for factors of production.
 Presumably, prevailing nominal interest rates are also incorporated
 into the costs of acquisitions made via "noninterest-bearing" trade
 credit, which affect, in turn, tax-deductible "costs of goods sold" and
 other factor costs. Thus, the use of debt-bearing explicit interest
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 charges does not seem essential for hedging against expected rates of
 inflation.8
 The results presented in table 9 deal with the extent to which firms
 alleviated the expected tax effects of inflation via the use of debt. Two
 different interest expense variables are used here. In the upper panel,
 interest expense is adjusted for the interest imputations made in the
 NIPA accounts. Since these imputations are not directly taxed, this
 variable does not seem to be precisely what we want. But it is an interest
 expense variable often used in works relying on NIPA data (see, e.g.,
 Holland and Myers 1977) and it is a variable for which data (for "all
 corporations") are available for the prewar period. Data on the seem-
 ingly more appropriate variable, net monetary interest, are only avail-
 able for the postwar period. Results based on this variable appear in the
 lower panel of table 9.
 The fact that the NIPA imputations are appropriately disregarded
 when measuring tax shields is not the only reason for favoring, on
 grounds of principle, the net monetary interest variable. When the net
 interest variable is used to measure the debt-induced tax shield against
 expected inflation, double counting is a result. In the NIPA accounts,
 imputed interest is presumed to be paid by financial businesses to
 nonfinancial businesses, individuals, and governmental units in order
 to account for financial services for which no explicit charges are
 made. If nonfinancial businesses (the only potential recipients relevant
 here) really do receive such services, presumably the total explicit
 costs of the productive factors used is less than it would otherwise be.
 Thus, if the NIPA imputations are allowed to lower nonfinancial busi-
 ness interest cost, there should be a simultaneous upward adjustment
 in the total explicit cost incurred for so-called financial services. Pre-
 sumably, the latter additional explicit costs would be tax deductible.
 Thus, not making this upward adjustment double counts the imputa-
 tions that distinguish the NIPA accounting system's net interest vari-
 able from its net monetary interest variable.
 Nevertheless, the data for both variables seem to tell the same story
 over the postwar period, as far as the results presented in table 9 are
 concerned. I shall therefore assume that net interest is an adequate
 8. This argument does not imply that any issuer of debt is "gaining" at the expense of
 debt holders. When nominal interest rates increase to take account of expected rates of
 inflation, issuers get an implicit tax deduction for the expected effects of inflation. But,
 other things equal, the changes in nominal rates imply changes in the nominal income
 and, thus, tax liabilities of debt holders. Presumably, debt holders (in the aggregate) take
 their expected changes in tax liabilities into account when equilibrium nominal interest
 rates are set (along the lines described by Miller [1977]). When applied to the issues at
 hand, Miller's framework implies that, in equilibrium, no individual firm will be moti-
 vated to alter its financing decisions, given its production-investment decisions. This
 does not imply the absence of adjustments by firms in the aggregate, in response to, e.g.,
 unanticipated shocks that disturb attained equilibria. Our results, which are based on
 aggregate data, necessarily deal with aggregate responses.
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 proxy for net monetary interest for the other time periods considered
 here.
 The interest/cash-flow variable used for table 9 is a measure of the
 relative importance (in real terms) of the tax shield provided by debt-
 bearing explicit interest charges. (Reliance on this measure presumes
 that the net shield provided by noninterest-bearing debt is equal to zero
 for the corporate sector as a whole.) This ratio should be an increasing
 function of the expected rate of inflation if it is to offset, at least in part,
 the increasing real rate of taxation induced by the joint effects of price
 level changes and a proportional tax system based on historical cost
 accounting methods. Since nominal interest rates are not expected to
 incorporate unanticipated inflation, the conditional expected value of
 our interest/cash-flow variable should be unaffected by [LTt - E(t)1.
 The results for all periods are consistent with this implication.
 Insofar as the expected rate of inflation is concerned, our results for
 the postwar period are consistent with the predicted positive value for
 ,38 when Yt-, is not in our regression model. The statistical significance
 implied by our results disappears, however, when Yt-1 is allowed to
 enter with a nonzero estimated coefficient. But during the prewar
 period, the results for ,31 are consistent with a nonpositive value of I31.
 The shift from a prewar nonpositive value to a postwar value that is at
 least nonnegative is a shift in the "right direction," in the sense that it
 is consistent with a relatively greater use of the debt-induced tax shield
 during the higher nominal tax rate (and higher inflation rate) period.
 Such a shift may provide part of the explanation for the apparent
 descriptive inadequacy of the tax-effects hypothesis. Specifically, such
 a shift is consistent with firms' adopting, and the tax authorities'
 permitting, actions that serve to alleviate the higher real tax burdens
 that would otherwise prevail.
 It is, perhaps, worth noting that the results for our net interest
 variable were among the few that were seriously affected by introduc-
 ing the industrial production variable into our model. When the con-
 straint 34 = 0.0 was in force, the prewar results for f1 were always
 substantially consistent with a significantly negative value, whether or
 not Yt-1 was allowed to have a nonzero coefficient. When the percent-
 age change in industrial production was included in our model, the
 estimation results for ,31 became quite dependent on whether Yt-1 was
 included in our model-for reasons that are not obvious to me.
 Capital Gains on Fixed Capital and Inventory
 This induced increase in real tax rates can also be alleviated by positive
 real capital gains on fixed capital and inventory-two types of assets
 presumed to be of special importance by the tax-effects hypothesis.
 This hypothesis predicts, for example, that unanticipated increases in
 the expected rate of inflation will lead to windfall-type capital losses,
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 because such increases are equivalent to unanticipated increases in real
 rates of taxation. And, of course, positive constant expected rates of
 inflation imply positive expected rates of change in real tax rates. The
 implications of these inflation-induced increases in expected real tax
 rates would be substantially weakened if, contrary to the tax-effects
 hypothesis, nominal capital gains were positively associated with the
 expected rate of inflation, implying that the expected capital gain varies
 directly with the expected rate of inflation. More generally, holdings of
 units of fixed capital and of units of inventory would both be complete
 hedges against expected (unexpected) rates of inflation if, for each type
 of asset, f,3 = 1.0 (12 = 1.0)
 The data on nominal capital gains were obtained as follows. Con-
 sider, for illustrative purposes, units of capital stock on hand at time
 t - 1. Let rdt denote the percentage change in the number of units of
 capital stock (i.e., depreciation or appreciation in real terms) per unit of
 capital stock on hand at time t - 1. If the productivity of the capital
 stock is proportional to the number of units, rdt is the rate of real
 economic depreciation when rdt < 0.0.
 The nominal capital gain, from t - 1 to t, per unit of capital stock on
 hand at time t - 1 is equal to
 RKt = (1 + FPt) (1 + rdt) - 1.0,
 where Fpt is the rate of change in the price of a unit of capital stock.
 The values of rpt and rdt can be obtained from our BEA data on the
 current value and constant value of fixed capital. Let Pt denote the
 price per unit of capital at time t; let Kt denote the number of units on
 hand at time t, and let t = 0 denote the "base year" used for constant-
 dollar data. The current-dollar and constant-dollar values of the net
 fixed capital stock at time t are, therefore, given by Ptkt and PoKt,
 respectively. Using these values, for time t - 1 and time t, one gets
 ___t_Pt -1.0 = (PtKt)I(P0Kt) - 1.0, rP = xD - I . (Pt- Kt- 1) (POKt- 1)
 and
 - _ Dt - PoDt
 rdt VK-, I VK-
 where (PoDt) is the constant-dollar value of depreciation for the period
 t - 1 to t; Dt is, therefore, the implied total loss of units of productive
 capacity.
 Note that the value of RKt is not the value of the total return per unit
 of capital over the period t - 1 to t, because it does not incorporate a
 measure of the real output per unit of capital stock. The latter variable
 is a flow component of the total return to capital, which is implied by
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 use of this factor of production. This component is, in effect, analogous
 to the dividend component of the total return on common stock. And
 the value of RKt is analogous to the conventional capital gain compo-
 nent. We shall deal with the output (or flow) component in the next
 section.
 Estimation results for capital gains rates are presented in tables 10
 and 11. Table 10 presents results for fixed nonresidential capital condi-
 tional on the SL depreciation method. Results based on the DDB
 method led to essentially the same inferences. So did results for differ-
 ent service-life assumptions. Only results for service lives equal to .85F
 are presented here. Table 11 provides results for residential capital and
 for inventory. For inventory, rdt 0.0 for each t. The results for
 residential capital are also based, as before, on the SL depreciation
 method and the .85F service-life assumption.
 The results for fixed nonresidential capital are consistent with a
 positive effect of expected inflation on the conditional expected value
 of the capital gains rate. For the postwar period, the results for f,3 and
 132 are substantially consistent with f3 = 1.0 and 12 = 1.0 when Yt-1 is
 not in the model. When it is in, the results are still quite consistent with
 132 = 1.0 but not with f3 = 1.0. Since Yft1 and E(rt) are positively
 correlated, the apparent dependency between the estimated values of
 ,38 and f3 should not be surprising. Of course, since both Yt-l and E(7Tt)
 are positively serially correlated, the positive covariation of Yt-1 and
 E(rt) may be "spurious," in the sense described by Granger and New-
 bold (1974). In any event, it does seem that fixed nonresidential capital
 served as at least a partial hedge against both components of inflation.
 The results for residential capital are roughly the same as those for
 nonresidential fixed capital, particularly for the postwar period. The
 results for inventory are quite different. Inventory always seems to
 provide more than a complete hedge against the unexpected compo-
 nent of the inflation rate. And for at least the overall and postwar
 periods, it seems to be at least a complete hedge against the expected
 component. Both of these features of inventory holdings would have
 alleviated the adverse predictions of the tax-effects hypothesis with
 respect to firms' posttax real profitability.
 Real Output Rates
 Results for proxies for the flow component of the return to total fixed
 capital plus inventory are described in table 12. The "cash flow" and
 "total profits tax" data used for table 12 are identical to those used
 before. The denominators used for this table were computed using our
 BEA data on total fixed capital (i.e., residential plus nonresidential
 fixed capital) and on inventory holdings. The numerators and de-
 nominators used here are both in terms of current dollars. Thus, the
 computed output rates are in real terms.
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 Given the previously discussed results on capital gains, the results in
 table 12 would be inconsistent with the adverse predictions of the
 tax-effects hypothesis if they are consistent with real output rates that
 are at worst unaffected by either component of inflation. In this case,
 the inferences made earlier about capital gains would apply to total
 periodic returns, too.
 On balance, the results in table 12, for both after-tax and before-tax
 net operating cash flows, are basically consistent with nonnegative
 values of both ,8f and /2. And in some cases the results are consistent
 with significantly positive values of/,1. These results are conditional on
 SL depreciation and .85F service lives. Different depreciation methods
 and service-life assumptions led to essentially the same results.
 The only seemingly important inconsistency with :1 : 0.0 appears in
 the before-tax real output rate for the postwar period. But this is
 contrary to the tax-effects hypothesis, in its pure form, because it
 pertains to before-tax, not after-tax, returns. The before-tax r-eal re-
 turns are not predicted to be increasing functions of either component
 of inflation by that hypothesis. Indeed, it predicts constant before-tax
 real returns (conditional on an output level) and decreasing after-tax
 real returns.
 The difference between the data used for the top and bottom panels
 of table 12 is due to the adjustment for total profits taxes. Taken at face
 value, the results in table 12 for the postwar before-tax returns are
 consistent with the statement that inflation is a proxy for "business
 conditions" and that positive expected rates of inflation are "bad for
 business." The corresponding after-tax results are consistent with the
 tax system's alleviating the effects of adverse business conditions.
 V. Remarks on the Descriptive Inadequacy
 of the Tax-Effects Hypothesis
 Tax Code Issues
 Our results are consistent with the existence of forces that at least
 alleviated the effects predicted by the tax-effects hypothesis, particu-
 larly with respect to the postwar period. Changes in the income tax
 code (or its application) that had the same ultimate effect that formal
 indexation would have had can induce such forces. Changes in the
 code (or its application) consistent with this "indirect indexation"
 perspective could involve, for example, increasing (decreasing) allow-
 able service lives on depreciable assets and liberalizing (restricting)
 conditions under which accelerated depreciation methods could be
 used during and after periods of inflation (deflation). An examination of
 the parts of the federal income tax provisions pertaining to depreciation
 suggests that such changes did take place, especially when one com-
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 pares the primarily inflationary postwar period with the prewar period,
 which encompasses several deflationary periods.9
 During the prewar period, the changes that took place seemed to be
 in the direction of reducing firms' latitude of choice. For example, the
 various editions of Bulletin F-which supplied guideline service lives
 for depreciable assets-seemed to have been motivated by such an
 .objective. The first edition of Bulletin F, published in 1920, appeared
 willing to rely upon "prevailing business practices," without supplying
 any data-based guidelines. The next edition, published in 1931 (after
 some nontrivial price-level declines), was accompanied by a document
 entitled Preliminary Report on Depreciation Studies, which stipulated
 the "probable useful life" and the corresponding SL depreciation rate
 for each of 2,700 different kinds of industrial assets. The third edition of
 Bulletin F, published in 1942, also specified guideline service lives, but
 for 5,000 different types of assets (see U.S. Department of the Trea-
 sury, Internal Revenue Service 1942).
 Changes in the direction of restrictiveness are also implied by the
 informational and "burden-of-proof" demands placed on taxpayers.
 Treasury Decision 4422 (which constituted an amendment to existing
 regulations) is illustrative in this regard. Evidently IRS inferred, on the
 basis of its own studies, that the depreciation deductions taken by
 many firms had been "excessive," in the sense that continued applica-
 tion of past depreciation methods would lead to "fully depreciated
 assets" before the assets' useful lives were attained. As a result, the
 Treasury seemed to want to reduce depreciation taken in future years
 to the extent that it was thought to be excessive in the past. This
 supposedly constituted important motivation for Treasury Decision
 4422 (issued in February 1934).
 This decision made three important changes: (1) It required that
 taxpayers supply detailed schedules of information to be used in sub-
 stantiating depreciation deductions. (2) It required that all future de-
 preciation charges be limited to what would be needed to recover
 undepreciated balances over assets' remaining useful lives. (3) It
 placed the burden of justifying depreciation deductions on taxpayers.
 Before, this change, a deduction could not be disallowed unless IRS
 could show-with "clear and convincing evidence"-that a deduction
 claimed by a taxpayer was unreasonable.
 Developments with respect to depreciation methods seemed to have
 been consistent with moves toward greater restrictiveness over the
 prewar period. No taxpayer was required, as a matter of law, to use
 any particular methods. But for the pre-1945 years, the SL method
 9. The discussion provided below draws heavily on the following: Montgomery (1917,
 1936); Montgomery, Taylor, and Richardson (1946, 1947); Grant and Norton (1955);
 McCarthy (1968, 1974); Coughlan and Strand (1969); Mertens (1973); and Commerce
 Clearing House (1978).
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 seemed to be the only one to which IRS gave (at least unofficial) pr-ior
 approval. (In general, the acceptability of all accounting methods de-
 pends on the IRS commissioner's approval.) It is, for example, the only
 method explicitly mentioned in the 1931 edition of Blulletin F and IRS's
 Mimeograph 4170 issued on April 4, 1934. Pronouncements with re-
 spect to the declining-balance method seemed to reflect this IRS posi-
 tion. In 1927, it ruled that neither approval nor disapproval of the
 declining-balance method would be given in advance of an audit of a
 taxpayer's annual return. This ruling was not officially modified until
 1946, when IRS ruled that it would approve of the declining-balance
 method's use in advance of an audit if this method "accords with the
 method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of the
 taxpayer"; in another 1946 ruling, it limited the rate used under the
 declining-balance method to a maximum of 150% of the SL rate that
 would otherwise be appropriate.'0 The positions adopted by the Trea-
 sury in cases that went before the tax court in the pre-1946 period are
 consistent with an intention of restricting the use of the declining-
 balance method.
 Developments during the war period (e.g., the provisions regarding
 emergency facilities and the capital gains/losses treatment of gains and
 losses on property used in a trade or business) and developments
 during the postwar period seemed to reflect a different attitude. For
 example, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides advance ap-
 proval of two basic accelerated methods: the sum-of-the-years' digits
 method and the declining-balance method, with the rate used for the
 latter limited to twice the appropriate SL rate computed without regard
 to salvage value. Advance approval of the SL method was also reiter-
 ated. (These provisions applied to post-1953 acquisitions.)
 In 1962, a revised edition of Bulletin F was published. This edition
 provided guideline lives for classes of assets (rather than for specific
 items). These suggested lives were claimed to be 30%-40% shorter
 than those provided in the earlier (1942) edition of Blulletini F. In
 addition, a so-called reserve ratio test was specified, which could have
 been used to justify even shorter lives. (Justification based on "all the
 facts and circumstances" was, in general, also still available.) When it
 appeared that many firms would fail the reserve ratio test, the test was
 changed in 1965 (via Revenue Procedure 65-13)!
 10. Advance approval of the declining balance method was via U.S. Department of the
 Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (1946-52), p. 42. The origin of the "official" maxi-
 mum rate (under DDB) equal to 150% of the normal SL rate seems to have been a 1946
 special ruling dealing with rental housing (see Montgomery et al. [1947], p. 875).
 Finally, note that a tie-in between tax reporting and financial reporting is usually associ-
 ated with adopting the LIFO inventory method for tax reporting. Thus the first 1946
 ruling regarding depreciation methods surprised me.
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 Around 1971, it appeared that the modified reserve ratio test would
 still not be passed by many firms. This is the setting that led, in part, to
 the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) System, for assets (excluding
 structures) placed in service in 1971 or later, and a new Class Life (CL)
 System for assets placed in service before 1971 (for taxable years
 ending after December 1970). The CL System specifically eliminates
 the reserve ratio test for pre-1971 acquisitions. The ADR provisions
 allowed for service lives shorter than the guideline lives proposed in
 1962.
 And, of course, the year 1962 witnessed the enactment of the in-
 vestment tax credit. This credit was suspended in 1966, restored in
 1967, suspended again in 1969, restored again in 1971, and further
 extended and revised after that time. Each of these developments
 seemed to have been motivated by "prevailing economic condi-
 tions. "1I
 It must be admitted that this sort of analysis of historical devel-
 opments lends itself to "ex post reasoning" and unintentional selectiv-
 ity. For this reason, I do not want to lean too heavily on the remarks
 above. But the basic point of my argument does seem justifiable.
 Relative to what took place in the prewar period, the postwar de-
 velopments were substantially in the direction of liberalization of
 provisions pertaining to depreciation deductions. And these develop-
 ments can account for the apparent postwar descriptive inadequacy
 of the tax-effects hypothesis, at least relative to its descriptive power
 with respect to the prewar period. Moreover, given the sorts of argu-
 ments advanced in favor of these developments, it seems plausible that
 they were intended to have the same effects (on, e.g., profitability and
 investment incentives) that formal indexation would have had.
 When viewed relative to prewar developments, postwar develop-
 ments regarding the use of LIFO for tax reporting seem to point in
 the same direction (see, e.g., Butters and Niland [1949, chap. 3] for
 remarks on early postwar events). The increased relative importance of
 tax deductible interest charges also serves to alleviate the changes in
 real tax burdens predicted by the tax-effects hypothesis.
 Relative Price Changes and Real Wealth Shifts
 The tax-effects hypothesis draws heavily on the tools of partial equilib-
 rium analyses. Ignored by its presumptions and predictions are such
 things as changes in relative prices and the distribution of wealth. Once
 the latter sorts of things are taken into account, the predictions of the
 11. It is also well to note that subsidy programs such as the investment tax credit can
 be substantially nonneutral. Thus, they can contribute to shifts in the distribution of real
 wealth, such as those considered in the next section. For analyses of this feature of the
 investment tax credit, see, e.g., Sunley (1973) and Bradford (1978).
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 tax-effects hypothesis seem much less convincing. For example, if
 nonzero rates of inflation are accompanied by wealth redistributions
 because of the sorts of assets (nominal vs. nonmonetary) held by
 various types of agents, then one can expect, in general, shifts in
 patterns of consumption. And these shifts may be relatively advan-
 tageous to firms for which fixed capital services and inventory ser-
 vices are important factors of production. In short, such potential shifts
 in demand functions can alleviate the cost function shifts predicted by
 the tax-effects hypothesis (because of predicted changes in real tax
 burdens). And they can lead to real capital gains on current holdings of
 units of fixed capital and units of inventory.
 The evidence presented here is not based on tests dealing specifically
 with this issue of demand and cost function shifts. But the empirical
 results on, for example, firms' capital expenditure rates and rates of
 growth in net capital-which reflects firms' decisions about allocating
 real resources-seem consistent with such favorable shifts.
 Additional remarks and evidence on the importance of relative price
 changes and changes in the distribution of real income are provided
 by Minarik (1978) and Nulty (1979). Remarks on evidence dealing
 specifically with real wealth redistribution due to capital gains and
 losses (realized and unrealized) are provided by Eisner (1979).
 The Expenditure Side of the Government Budget
 The major predictions of the tax-effects hypothesis are based on the
 changes in real tax burdens implied by a nonindexed income tax system
 and nonzero rates of inflation. This partial equilibrium approach
 abstracts from the critical "other side" of the government budget, the
 expenditure side. If the predicted changes in resources drawn from the
 private sector are accompanied by changes in the pattern of real gov-
 ernmental expenditures, there are even stronger reasons for expecting
 the sorts of relative price and real wealth changes mentioned above. In
 technical terms, the changes on the tax side may not be "distri-
 butionally neutral," in the sense defined by, for example, McClure and
 Thirsk (1975).
 Such changes on the expenditure side seem particularly likely when
 stabilization goals are actively pursued. As indicated in the section
 entitled Remarks on the Descriptive Adequacy of the Tax-Effects
 Hypothesis, this may lead to the relationships between the components
 of inflation rates and, say, corporate profitability and investment in-
 centives. But the implied relationships and their interpretations would
 differ from those associated with the tax-effects hypothesis. In short,
 expected and unanticipated rates of inflation may simply be serving as
 proxies for governmental actions motivated by stabilization goals.
 Changes on the expenditure side of the government budget may also
This content downloaded from 130.91.118.71 on Thu, 26 May 2016 20:30:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 "Tax Effects" of Inflation 263
 result from active pursuit of income transfer goals (in this regard, see,
 e.g., Browning and Johnson [1979]).
 VI. Summary and Implications
 The general topics of interest here are the potential substantive eco-
 nomic effects of accounting techniques, conditional on the prevailing
 economic conditions and institutional structure. The joint effects of
 historical cost accounting methods and price-level changes were the
 specific objects of analysis in this paper.
 It is usually argued that the failure to use indexation (i.e., the use of
 historical cost accounting techniques) necessarily implies that real
 rates of income tax will vary directly with rates of inflation. This
 substantive effect of mere bookkeeping methods is often predicted
 even though the predicted effect is recognized to have adverse impli-
 cations. This is the so-called tax-effects hypothesis whose descriptive
 adequacy was investigated in this paper.
 I inferred that the empirical results presented here are not consistent
 with the tax-effects hypothesis. The results are consistent with the joint
 hypothesis that (1) the effects of indexing the tax system were attained
 via the government's providing alternative options to firms (in the form
 of, e.g., liberalized depreciation rules), (2) firms exploited available
 devices (e.g., the use of debt-induced tax shields) to alleviate the
 changes in real tax burdens jointly implied by price-level changes and a
 tax code based on historical cost accounting methods, and (3) these
 predicted changes in real tax burdens were alleviated by favorable
 demand function shifts (due, e.g., to patterns of governmental ex-
 penditures, relative price changes, etc.).
 In any event, what does seem most clear is that fixating exclusively
 on the implications of accounting techniques-for a given institutional
 structure and conditional on prevailing economic conditions-may not
 lead to a descriptively adequate model. This seems, moreover, to be a
 very likely result when the decision makers whose decisions are being
 (implicitly) modeled are among those who can alter accounting tech-
 niques or the effects of techniques. Why, for example, would firms
 knowingly allow their real tax burdens to increase when they can adopt
 techniques (e.g., accelerated depreciation methods) that prevent or
 mitigate the effects of such results? Why are firms not assumed to
 exploit other features of the prevailing rules of taxation-such as the
 tax deductibility of interest charges-for the same reason? And why
 is the government presumed to allow such increases in real tax burdens
 independently of their implications for the overall level of economic
 activity and for the pattern of real resource allocations? A model that
 does not account for such potential private and public sector responses
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 and that also assumes rational economic behavior seems somewhat
 strange. More important, it seems likely to omit variables that are
 important for attaining descriptive adequacy.12
 Appendix
 Remarks on Data
 Detailed descriptions of the data series used here are given in the data sources
 identified in the text; repeating those details here seems pointless, and I make
 no attempt to do this. Instead, I briefly describe the BEA capital stock data,
 some of the NIPA series, and the expected rates of inflation.
 BEA Capital Stock Data
 The BEA capital stock data pertain to fixed nonresidential business and resi-
 dential capital in the United States. Detailed tabulations based on historical
 costs, current costs, and constant-dollar costs are presented for stocks of
 durable equipment and nonresidential structures owned or operated by private
 business and for residential capital located in the United States. These capital
 stock data are consistent with the data prepared by BEA for its NIPA. In
 addition, the data are presented under various service-life assumptions and
 under various depreciation methods. These data result from a larger project
 which also deals with stocks of business inventories.
 BEA's capital stock data were obtained by applying the "perpetual in-
 ventory method" to data on investment flows. That is, data on stocks are
 obtained by cumulating investment flows, adjusting for withdrawals, and, for
 net capital stocks, adjusting for depreciation.
 The data on investment flows used by BEA are those that enter the estimates
 of Gross National Product (GNP). Specifically, these flows consist of (1) the
 nonresidential and residential fixed investments that are included in the "gross
 private domestic investment" component of GNP and (2) the government
 purchases of residential capital that are included in the "government purchases
 of goods and services" component of GNP.
 The BEA capital stock data pertain to newly produced assets and to stocks
 stemming from (net) acquisitions by business of secondhand items from other
 12. I suspect that the same sorts of issues are relevant to areas other than the tax
 effects of inflation and historical cost accounting techniques. It is claimed, for example,
 that the FASB's recently adopted "expensing" rules for R & D expenditures will have
 adverse implications for investments in R & D and innovative behavior (see e.g.,
 Horwitz and Kolodny [1979]). But why would rational economic agents allow this to
 occur solely because of bookkeeping mechanics? Perhaps if it does occur, its occurrence
 is really independent of these mechanics. But those whose "oxen are gored" by its
 occurrence may find these mechanics and the FASB to be handy scapegoats. Or perhaps
 the effects of the techniques are consistent with the objectives of the "powers that be,"
 and, as a result, these effects would have been induced via alternative routes if not by the
 techniques. Similar issues can be raised with respect to recent debates over oil and gas
 accounting and accounting for foreign currency translations (see, e.g., Collins, Dent, and
 O'Conner [1978]; Collins and Dent [in press]; and Dyckman and Smith [1979], with
 respect to oil and gas accounting; and Burns [1976] and Dukes [1978], with respect to
 foreign currency translations).
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 sectors. Such acquisitions were, according to BEA, quite large after World
 War II, when private businesses acquired equipment and structures that were
 owned by the government during this war.
 BEA used original acquisition prices to value intersector transfers of used
 assets other than government surplus assets. Some of these government sur-
 plus assets are also valued at their original acquisition prices. But those that
 were "less suited to postwar than war use" were valued at (what are claimed to
 be) the prices that business would have been willing to pay for new assets of
 equal productivity designed specifically for the civilian uses to which these
 government surplus assets were put. "Government-owned, privately-oper-
 ated" (GOPO) assets are excluded. (Remarks on the importance of these as-
 sets are given in Gordon [1969].)
 For nonresidential fixed capital, BEA provides net capital stock data under
 alternative assumptions about service lives and depreciation methods (namely,
 SL and DDB). The results presented in the text are based on the data for
 service lives equal to 85% of those specified in the 1942 edition of the Internal
 Revenue Service's Bulletin F (U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal
 Revenue Service 1942). Table Al gives the .85F lives used by BEA, and it
 indicates the types of assets included in BEA's categories of assets.
 Various price indices were used by BEA in order to obtain its current-dollar,
 and the related constant-dollar, data. BEA attempts to adjust for quality
 changes to the extent that such changes are reflected in the contemporaneous
 relative prices of new and old capital goods. In general, one unit of a new item
 is considered to be equivalent to one unit of the old item multiplied by the ratio
 of the acquisition cost of the new item to the contemporaneous acquisition cost
 of the old item for an "overlap" time period. If there is no overlap period, BEA
 effects a hypothetical comparison by estimating what it would have cost to
 produce the new item in a period in which the old item was available.
 NIPA Data
 The NIPA data (as revised in 1977 and 1978) resulted from a comprehensive
 benchmark revision of the NIPAs of the United States completed in 1976.
 Definitions of some of the series used in this paper are given below.
 Corporate profits before tax is the income of corporations organized for
 profit and mutual financial institutions that accrues to U.S. residents, measured
 before profits taxes, before deduction of depletion charges, after exclusion of
 capital gains and losses, and net of dividends received from domestic corpo-
 rations. In addition to profits earned from domestic operations, this number
 includes net receipts of dividends and branch profits from abroad. In other
 important respects, this profits number is defined in accordance with U.S.
 federal income tax regulations.
 Profits tax liability consists of federal, state, and local taxes on corporate
 income.
 Net interest consists of interest paid by domestic business less interest
 received by it, plus net interest received from abroad. In addition to monetary
 interest flows, net interest includes interest in kind (i.e., "imputed interest"),
 as described in the text.
 Capital consumption allowance consists of depreciation charges and acci-
 dental damages to fixed business capital. For nonfarm business, these amounts
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 TABLE Al BEA Service-Life Assumptions by Type of Asset
 .85F
 Life
 Type of Asset (Years)
 Equipment:
 Furniture and fixtures 15
 Fabricated metal products 18
 Engines and turbines 21
 Tracto s 8
 Agricultural machinery (except tractors) 17
 Construction machinery (except tractors) 9
 Mining and oilfield machinery 10
 Metalworking machinery 16
 Special industry machinery, nec* 16
 General industrial, including materials handling, equipment 14
 Office, computing, and accounting machinery 8
 Service industry machines 10
 Electrical machinery 14
 Trucks, buses, and truck trailers 9
 A tos 10
 ircraft 9
 Ships and boats 22
 Railroad equipment 25
 Instruments 11
 Other equipment 11
 Nonresidential structures:
 Industrial buildings 27
 Commercial buildings 36
 Religious buildings 48
 Educational buildings 48
 Hospital and institutional buildings 48
 Other nonfarm nonresidential buildings 31
 Railroad structures 51
 Telephone and telegraph structures 27
 Electric light and power structures 30
 Gas structures 30
 Other public utility structures 26
 Farm nonresidential buildings 38
 Petroleum, gas, and other mineral drilling and exploration 16




 Additions and alterations 40
 5 or more unit structures:
N w 65
 Additions and alterations 32
 Mobile homes 16
 Nonhousekeeping 40
 Equipment 11
 Government-owned, privately operated:
 Atomic Energy Commission:
 Equipment 25
 Structures 32
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 TABLE Al (Continued)
 .85F
 Life
 Type of Asset (Years)
 National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
 Equip ent 15
 Structures: Manufacturing 32
 Structures: Nonmanufacturing 37
 Department of Defense:
 Equipment 19
 Structures 32
 Maritime Administration 22
 SOURCE.-U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1976), pp. T-6-T-7,
 table B.
 *nec = not elsewhere clarified.
 are as reported on federal income tax returns. For farms, they are based on
 NIPA calculations.
 Capital consumption adjustment equals the tax-return-based capital con-
 sumption allowance less a capital consumption allowance based on estimates
 of economic service lives, SL depreciation, and replacement cost.
 Gross domestic product is a measure of production that excludes the NIPA
 "rest-of-the-world" production. Specifically, it is the market value of goods
 and services produced by labor and property located in the United States.
 Expected Rates of Inflation
 The expected annual rates of inflation used here were kindly supplied by G.
 William Schwert (University of Rochester). His estimates resulted from time-
 series analyses of monthly and annual percentage changes in the Consumer
 Price Index. The specific results used here are those associated with what
 appeared to be the most adequate time-series model, relative to those con-
 sidered by Schwert and to the strict martingale model.
 Schwert's analyses encompassed four different methods of forecasting an-
 nual rates of inflation. Two methods involved computing forecasts of annual
 rates from forecasted monthly rates, for the months within each calendar year
 for which a forecast was desired. The other two methods involved forecasting
 annual rates of inflation with models applied directly to annual data. Some
 details on the four methods are given below.
 Forecast method no. 1: Annual forecasts based on one-step-ahead predic-
 tions of monthly rates of inflation. Model applied to monthly data is first-order
 moving average model for first differences (i.e., the so-called IMA(1,1)). Con-
 secutive one-step-ahead forecasts for the months of a given year are summed to
 get the implied forecast for the entire year, for the years 1913-75. The model
 for monthly rates was separately estimated for subperiods ranging in length
 from 6 to 12 years (i.e., 72-144 months). Thus, the monthly forecast errors are
 actually residuals. This is, in general, not the case for the corresponding annual
 forecast errors.
 Forecast method no. 2: Forecasts of annual rates of inflation are based on
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 consecutive K-step-ahead forecasts of monthly rates for the months within a
 year of interest, for K = 1,2, . . ., 12. The model used for a given year's monthly
 forecasts is estimated using monthly data from January 1913 to December of
 the preceding year. (Thus, the one-step-ahead forecast from the model esti-
 mated using data up to December of a given year is always for January of the
 next year, the two-step-ahead forecast is for February of the next year, etc.)
 The monthly forecasts for a given year were summed to get the implied annual
 forecast for that year, for each of the years 1916-75. (Data from 1913 to 1915
 provided "start up" data.)
 Forecast method no. 3: Forecasts of annual rates are based on the second-
 order autoregressive model applied directly to annual data for the years
 1912-76. The first forecast is for 1914. Forecast errors are, therefore, residuals
 from the estimated model.
 Forecast method no. 4: Forecasts of annual rates are based on the third-
 order moving average model applied to first differences of annual data from the
 period 1912-76. The first forecast is for 1914. ("Back forecasting" was used
 here.)
 Various properties of the annual forecast errors induced by these four
 methods and the strict martingale model (applied to annual data) were exam-
 ined. Bias, serial correlation, standard deviations, and mean-squared errors
 were among the properties examined, for the overall period 1916-75 and for the
 two subperiods 1916-46 and 1947-75. On the basis of these results, I inferred
 that forecast method no. 1 is the more adequate model.
 At first glance, it might seem inappropriate to use this model, which is based
 on monthly data, in conjunction with our annual data (i.e., the BEA, NIPA,
 and IRS data). But these other data presumably reflect the effects of decisions
 that were made and events that occurred throughout each year, rather than at,
 say, the beginning of each year. Changes in expected rates of inflation are
 among the potential intrayear influences on these decisions and events. The
 expected annual rates derived from our expected monthly rates can be viewed
 as summarizing the inflation expectations corresponding to the annual obser-
 vations on our other variables of interest. As with other sorts of aggregation,
 this type of summarization may involve a "loss of information" (on, e.g., the
 timing of intrayear changes in inflation expectations and the timing of changes
 in investment plans). I do not believe, however, that it involves any internal
 theoretical inconsistency.
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